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One-page refreshers

Every topic on one page: what it is, what to remember, what to run, what catches people, and how to check it worked.

Each one prints on a single A4 or letter page, for the desk or the incident bridge. There are 53 in all.

Download all 53 as one PDF

The tools

Infrastructure as code

Writing down the infrastructure you want in files, and letting a tool make reality match them.

Terraform and OpenTofu

A tool that creates and changes cloud resources to match .tf files. OpenTofu is its open-source fork, and takes the same files with tofu in place of terraform.

Ansible

A tool that logs in to machines you already have, over SSH, and runs a list of steps on each one. Nothing is installed on the machines first.

Argo CD

A controller inside a Kubernetes cluster that keeps the cluster matching a Git repository, and puts back changes made by hand.

The clouds

The four clouds

AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and Oracle Cloud share the same building blocks under different names.

Responding

Leading a cloud incident: the first hour

The same phases as any incident, with evidence that disappears faster, more ways for an attacker to come back, and most actions taken through APIs.

Incident command: roles and rhythm

Five roles adapted from the Incident Command System, the rhythm they work to, and how they pass from one person to a team.

Containment by what was compromised

The fastest safe way to cut an attacker off, by what they have, and what each move leaves open.

Preserving cloud evidence

Capture what disappears first, keep it where nobody can change it, and record who collected what.

Kubernetes for defenders

The common paths through a cluster, where each one leaves traces, and what stops it.

Incident response on Google Cloud

What Google Cloud records by default, how to read an identity out of it, and the first moves for each kind of compromise.

Container forensics

Where a container keeps its evidence, when each part disappears, and the order to capture it in.

Checkpoints and node memory

Which nodes let you checkpoint a container or capture their memory, and the commands for each on EKS and GKE.

Containers on GKE and EKS

What each cloud records about a cluster, how to keep a node, and what to rely on when you cannot reach it.

Incident response on AWS

What CloudTrail records by default, how to follow a key or a role session, and the first moves for each kind of compromise.

Incident response on Azure

What Azure records by default, how to read a caller or a sign-in, and the first moves for each kind of compromise.

Incident response on Oracle Cloud

What the Audit service records, how to read a principal, the credentials to revoke, and how to keep an instance's disks.

Containers on AKS and OKE

What each service records about a cluster, what a pod can reach on its node, and how to keep the node's disks.

Clearing an attacker out of a cluster

What outlives a deleted pod, where attackers persist in Kubernetes, and how to rotate what cannot be revoked.

Linux host triage

What to capture first on a suspect Linux machine, where persistence hides, and which logs matter.

macOS host triage

What to capture first on a suspect Mac, where persistence hides, and which artifacts answer which question.

Windows host triage

What to capture first on a suspect Windows machine, where persistence hides, and the events worth knowing by number.

Working an insider case

Triage, authority, evidence, and hand-over for a case about someone who is allowed in.

Reviewing infrastructure as a defender

What to look for in a pull request or a plan, so the next incident is caught in review.

Templates

A safe place to keep Terraform state

The state file contains secrets in plain text. This stores it encrypted, versioned, and locked while a run is in progress.

Evidence that survives termination

One tag or label keeps a machine alive, captures its disks and, on AWS, its memory, and cuts it off, in that order, on four clouds and Kubernetes.

Evidence from a compromised container

One script keeps a pod's node alive, records the pod, snapshots the node's disks, and cuts the pod off, on GKE, EKS, AKS, or OKE.

Audit logs nobody can delete

Send cloud audit logs to storage that refuses deletes for a set number of days.

Lock SSH down to keys only

Turn off password logins and root logins, and check the config before restarting so you cannot lock yourself out.

Send host logs off the machine

Forward system logs to a collector so they outlive the machine that wrote them.

Record what investigations ask first

auditd rules on Linux for account changes, sudo rights, SSH keys, persistence, kernel modules, and commands people ran as root.

Ask every host the same questions

osquery on Linux, macOS, and Windows, logging changes to accounts, keys, persistence, listening ports, and drivers.

Catch attackers at work on a server

Falco on plain Linux hosts, alerting on web shells, credential theft, and new programs in system folders.

Block the changes you never want

Policies that make dangerous actions fail outright, so there is nothing to alert on afterwards.

Check every resource against your rules, all the time

Continuous evaluation that flags a resource the moment it stops matching the standard.

Get cloud logs into your SIEM

A delivery pipe from cloud logging to the place your detections actually run.

Emergency access that works when login is broken

A separate account that does not depend on your identity provider, and shouts every time it is used.

Shell access without opening a port

Reach a server for troubleshooting with nothing listening on the internet, and a recording of the session.

Somewhere to keep secrets that rotates them

A managed store with scheduled rotation, a record of every read, and a way to take access away.

Encryption keys you control and can switch off

Your own keys, rotated on a schedule, with a usage log and an off switch.

Keep network records long enough to be useful

Traffic records stored cheaply for months, in a format you can query.

Point Argo CD at a repository

The first Application, which then manages every other application from Git.

See what containers are doing while they run

Runtime alerts installed by the same pipeline that ships the workloads, so they cannot fall behind.

An analysis machine that cannot reach production

A clean-room virtual machine for looking at suspicious files, with no route to anything live, on four clouds.

Cloud access for pipelines and pods without stored keys

Pipelines and pods prove who they are with short-lived tokens, so there is no cloud key to leak.

Stop risky pods before they start

Admission policies refuse privileged pods, host mounts, and unsigned images, and report every refusal.

A record of every action against the cluster API

Cluster audit logs sent where responders can search them, so exec into a pod or a new role binding is never invisible.

Pipeline security findings in front of responders

Secret scanning, push protection, and dependency alerts switched on and sent to the SIEM, so a leaked key is an incident.

Data that cannot leave your organisation

Perimeter policies so stolen credentials cannot copy data to an attacker's own account or project.

Notice data walking out the door

Alerts on the moves someone makes on the way out with data: sharing it outside, reading far more than usual, changing who can decrypt it, and quieting the logs.

Know who is using your AI models

Model call records on Bedrock, Vertex AI, Azure OpenAI, and OCI Generative AI, with alerts when logging or guardrails are turned off, or stolen keys go looking for models.

Catch account takeover at the identity provider

Alerts in Okta, Entra ID, Google Workspace, and Microsoft 365 on the moves that turn one stolen account into many. They cover admin rights granted, sign-in rules changed, MFA removed, mail forwarded out, and a log feed going quiet.

Encrypt and authorise every call between services

Mutual TLS between every service, and a deny-by-default rule for which service may call which.

Registry 0.23.0. Built 2026-11-17.

Made by Habibullah Tora. Source on GitHub. Code under the MIT licence, writing under CC BY 4.0.