Home/Refreshers/Data that cannot leave your organisation: refresher
Data that cannot leave your organisation
Perimeter policies so stolen credentials cannot copy data to an attacker's own account or project.
Remember
- A request with valid credentials: possibly stolen.
- The perimeter checks both ends: whose identity, whose resource, which network.
- Crossing the edge is refused: whatever the credentials allow.
- The attempt is logged: for the responders.
| Platform | Uses | The part that catches people |
|---|---|---|
| AWS | Service and resource control policies keyed on the organisation ID | Resource control policies stay off until switched on for the organisation. |
| Google Cloud | VPC Service Controls perimeter around sensitive projects | A perimeter refuses you too when you work from outside it, including in the console. |
| Azure | A network security perimeter around the resources, with Azure Policy behind it | Azure has no tenant-wide rule that keys on whose identity and whose resource, the way AWS and Google Cloud do. |
| Oracle Cloud | A deny policy keyed on a network source, with a security zone behind it | Oracle Cloud policies are allow-only until deny policies are on, so without that one-time switch the statements here are refused as invalid. |
Run the quick start
| Download providers | terraform init |
| Preview | terraform plan |
| Apply | terraform apply |
Watch out
- Stolen credentials keep their permissions.
- AWS services acting for you, such as CloudTrail writing to its bucket, pass the identity perimeter.
- Only AWS and Google Cloud have a tenancy-wide rule that keys on whose identity and whose resource.
Check it worked
With valid credentials, try to copy an object to a bucket in another organisation. It is refused.