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Cloud detection and response

What a cloud responder needs to know and have in place, and where this site covers each part.

Cloud incidents are decided by what was set up before they started: logs nobody can delete, evidence that survives autoscaling, keys that can be switched off, guardrails that refuse the dangerous call. Responders rarely build these themselves. They advise the teams who do, and they need to know what good looks like, what to ask for, and what each piece records when something goes wrong. This track is organised around that work, in 10 areas.

Leading a cloud incident

Detecting, scoping, containing, preserving, eradicating, and recovering across cloud accounts, Kubernetes, and pipelines, with one person clearly in command and leadership kept informed.

On this site

Evidence that survives

Disk and memory captured automatically at the moment of containment, so evidence from short-lived and autoscaled machines outlives the machine.

On this site

Kubernetes and container runtime

Investigating node and cluster compromise, container escape, admission bypass, and workload identity abuse, at the pod, node, and API server.

On this site

Telemetry you can hunt in

The cloud's own audit logs, network flow logs, and Kubernetes audit logs, collected, kept, and turned into detections.

On this site

Identity and guardrails to advise on

Roles with only the access they need, the ways one identity can become another, pipeline sign-in without stored keys, and rules set above the account. All of it reviewed and explained to the teams who own it.

On this site

Pipelines and supply chain

Leaked secrets, compromised builds, risky dependencies, and proof of where software came from, with pipeline findings reaching responders.

On this site

Hosts, in and out of the cloud

Investigation across Linux, macOS, and Windows, including the hosts under cloud workloads.

On this site

Insider cases

Recognising the steps someone with legitimate access takes on the way out with data, and working the case with HR and Legal so the findings stand up.

On this site

AI and LLM systems

Keeping a record of who called which model, and spotting stolen credentials used to run models on someone else's bill.

On this site

Teaching the next responder

Raising a team's cloud and container fluency, and turning each incident's findings into changes the owning teams make.

On this site

Companion sites

Detection content, hunting, and AI security live on their own sites.

Registry 0.23.0. Built 2026-11-17.

Made by Habibullah Tora. Source on GitHub. Code under the MIT licence, writing under CC BY 4.0.