output "network_source" { description = "The network source that counts as inside. Grants elsewhere can name it too: where request.networkSource.name = ''." value = oci_identity_network_source.inside.name } output "policy_ocids" { description = "The deny policies, one per compartment, and the lock on network sources." value = merge({ for c, p in oci_identity_policy.perimeter : c => p.id }, { network_sources = oci_identity_policy.lock_network_sources.id }) } output "verify" { description = "How to prove the perimeter works." value = <<-EOT From an office range or a named VCN: oci os object get --bucket-name --name --file - returns the object. From anywhere else, with the same credential: NotAuthorizedOrNotFound. Try Cloud Shell too, and read the result: it shows whether Cloud Shell counts as inside. From anywhere else: oci os bucket update --name --public-access-type ObjectRead is refused. From anywhere: oci os preauth-request create --bucket-name --name probe --access-type AnyObjectRead --time-expires 2030-01-01T00:00:00Z is refused. Confirm each subscription email first. Then edit a statement of a perimeter policy in the console and save: an email arrives within a few minutes. ${var.security_zone_recipe_ocid != "" ? "From inside, in a perimeter compartment: oci os bucket update --name --public-access-type ObjectRead is refused by the security zone." : "From inside, someone who may update buckets can still make one public. Set security_zone_recipe_ocid to refuse that."} A member of the default domain's Administrators group passes all of these: that group is exempt from every deny policy. EOT }